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Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust
and Beyond
The 2000 Wing Tat Lee Lecture*
Spencer Weber Waller**

I. INTRODUCTION

I am honored to be chosen to deliver the first Wing Tat Lee Lecture
of the new century. I will continue the themes of harmonization and
globalization that were the subject of the recent lectures in this series
and focus on the necessary and desirable changes
that globalism can
1
bring to the United States in the antitrust area.
There is vast literature on both harmonization and globalization.
Much of the extensive commentary, at least in the United States, is
outward looking. It focuses on how other countries have changed, or
should change, their laws and legal culture to more fully participate in
the global economy and the information age that is upon us. Other
commentators take a more cautionary view and examine the price being
paid by these same countries as a result of the changes they are
implementing.
. As a result of a gift to the Loyola University Chicago School of Law by Wing
Tat Lee, a
Hong Kong businessman and philanthropist, the School of Law established a lecture series in the
area of international and comparative law. The Wing Tat Lee lectureship has enabled the School
of Law to participate in ventures such as the Central and Eastern European Law Initiative
(CEELI) of the American Bar Association and to invite other speakers to the campus.
"" Professor and Director of the Institute of Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law; Professor, Brooklyn Law School, 1990-2000; 2000 Wing Tat Lee
Distinguished Lecturer, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.A., University of
Michigan, 1979; J.D., Northwestern University Law School, 1982. Many thanks to my gracious
hosts at Loyola University Chicago School of Law for the opportunity to meet with faculty,
alumni, and students over the course of my week-long visit to the Law School in March, 2000.
Thanks also to Lan Cao, Peter Carstensen, Larry Solan, and Mark Warner for their helpful
comments on drafts of this manuscript and to Wose Tura Ebba for her research assistance.
1. See Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Its Challenges for Law and Society, 29 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 891 (1998) (explaining the effects of liberalization of trade policies in the United States,
Russia and Central and Eastern Europe); Tahirih V. Lee, Mixing River Water and Well Water:
The Harmonizationof Hong Kong and PRC Law, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 627 (1999) (describing the
growing similarities between law in Hong Kong and law in the People's Republic of China).
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I want to take a different point of view and examine the lessons to be
learned by the United States as a result of globalism. In particular, I
want to focus on the area of antitrust or competition law, where the
United States is a leader and one of the senior statesmen in the field.2
From this vantage point, we in the United States are often quick to
teach, lecture, and criticize other legal systems that frequently do
nothing worse than enact and enforce competition law in a manner that
is different from the way we approach the same type of problems. The
extreme version of this syndrome is, of course, both arrogant and
offensive to sophisticated legal systems seeking to achieve varying
objectives in a culture and history different from our own.
To change, we must do two things. First, we must acquire the ability
to analyze other legal systems from the point of view of whether legal
rules and institutions serve their needs, not ours. Second, we must
begin to study and analyze the developments of the more than eighty
foreign systems of competition law for the lessons we can use to reform
our own system of competition law to better play the role of antitrust
senior statesman in a global economy.
This essay is a plea for change in the United States based on the
lessons learned abroad both in antitrust law and in the broader issues of
economic regulation and national sovereignty. It is not intended as an
answer to these vexing issues but rather as the beginning of a different
type of dialogue 3 and a richer role for the United States in the global
marketplace and world community.
II. GLOBALISM IS A TwO-WAY STREET
While the United States has never been particularly good at
comparative law matters in any field, its absence has been painfully
obvious and particularly detrimental in the antitrust field. One simple

2. As a formal matter, the United States was not the first nation to have an antitrust law. That
honor goes to Canada, which passed its anticombines act in 1889, a year prior to the enactment of
the Sherman Act. See Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combines Formed in Restraint
of Trade, S.C. 1889, c. 41 (Can.).
3. One of the few similar types of analysis of this topic can be found in an earlier article by
then professor, now Judge, Diane P. Wood's provocative essay in 1994, addressing how "the
existence of a global market is affecting the theory and application of these laws within the
United States." See Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 409 (1994). I share Judge Wood's concern that state action
immunity is an inappropriate distortion of United States antitrust policy and that foreign
experience has shown a better way. See infra notes 24-59 and accompanying text (discussing
state action immunity and its detrimental effect on competition). Otherwise, Judge Wood and I
discuss different issues where an examination of foreign developments would point to a better
way for the United States.

2000]

Bringing Globalism Home

contrast is the way the European Community and the United States
approach competition law. In the European Community, private
parties,4 the European Commission,5 the Court of First Instance,6 and
the European Court of Justice 7 are conversant with, and frequently
discuss United States' antitrust precedent, academic commentary, and
government enforcement policy in formulating their own initiatives and
decisions. While U.S. cases and policy are not slavishly followed, they
frequently comprise part of the debate about proper action and, if not
followed, are analyzed and rejected on the merits. The same is true in
Canada,8 Australia, 9 New Zealand,' 0 and many other nations that are
serious about the enforcement of competition law. These countries
routinely take the time and effort to be aware of developments in sister
jurisdictions and respond to those developments when drafting and
revising competition statutes, formulating enforcement policy and
guidelines, and bringing enforcement actions. In contrast, no United
States' court has ever cited to a foreign competition law decision for
anything other than the background or procedural history of the case. 11

4. See MARK FURSE, COMPETITION LAW OF THE UK AND EC (1999) (offering numerous
comparisons with and discussions of the United States' antitrust principles); VALENTINE KORAH,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EC COMPETITION LAW (1997) (offering teaching materials which
contain numerous references to United States antitrust case law and statutes).
5. See Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy: Green Paper from the Commission of the
European Communities, COM(96)721 final at 12-17. The final version of the reforms proposed
by the Commission are set forth in the "Commission Regulation on the Application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices," adopted by
the Commission on Dec. 22, 1999. See The European Commission, Europa (visited May 31,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comnlcompetition/antitrust/others.htm>.
6. See, e.g., Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 1-755, [1997] 4
C.M.L.R. 726 (Ct. First Instance 1997).
7. For a discussion of the general use of United States Supreme Court cases in the European
Court of Justice, see Peter Herzog, United States Supreme Court Cases in the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 903 (1998).
8. See Regina v. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc'y [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (Can.); Attorney-General v.
Law Soc'y of British Columbia [19821 2 S.C.R. 307 (Can.).
9. See Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. Boral Ltd. (1999) 166 A.L.R. 409
(Austl.); Robert Hicks Party Ltd. v. Melway Publ'g Party Ltd. (1998) 42 I.P.R. 627 (Austl.);
News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby Football League Ltd. (1996) 135 A.L.R. 33 (Austl.); Trade
Practices Comm'n v. Gillette Co. (1993) 118 A.L.R. 280 (Austl.).
10. See Fisher & Paykel Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 731; Union Shipping
NZ Ltd. v. Port Nelson Ltd. [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 662.
11. A recent United States case is a partial exception in discussing European Union
competition rules in order to hold that a plaintiff had an adequate remedy abroad in dismissing a
United States antitrust case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Capital Currency
Exch. v. National Westminster Bank, 155 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1067 (1999).
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This is a uniquely opportune time for the United States to do better in
regards to comparative competition law. The transnational business
community is exposed to numerous different sets of competition laws
around the world. This community can transmit that information home
through its United States and foreign counsel as to good, bad, and
indifferent experiences which can be compared to treatment under
competition rules in the United States. Government officials are
increasingly in contact with each other through both formal 12 and
informal 13 cooperation arrangements that require a tremendous amount
of information sharing about different aspects of competition law.
Moreover, an increasing body of information on comparative
competition law is finally available throughout the world via the
internet 14 and various published English language material.' 5
Even if the United States is affirmatively uninterested in what it can
learn from the rest of the world, the tremendous effort the United States
has made to sell the Sherman Act abroad 16 has exposed it to the way
competition law is enforced elsewhere. This exposure has produced
changes in the way in which the United States addresses these issues as
an unconscious, and largely unforeseen, side
effect of trying to convince
17
the rest of the world to do things our way.

12. See JAMES R. ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §§ 14.314.7 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the increasing set of antitrust cooperation agreements governing
relationships between United States and foreign enforcement agencies).
13. Over the past decade, government competition enforcers frequently interact at a network
of regularly scheduled and ad hoc professional and scholarly conferences and other gatherings,
including those sponsored by the American Bar Association, the International Bar Association,
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, which runs an annual two day conference devoted to
international antitrust law and policy, and, most recently, a series of hearings conducted by the
United States Departmnent of Justice International Competition Policy Advisory Committee.
14. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law (visited May 31, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrustlinks.html>. This website, maintained by the American Bar
Association, contains links to the vast majority of websites of foreign competition authorities.
See id.
15. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Comparative Competition Law as a Form of Empiricism,
23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 455 (1997) (comparing approaches to antitrust law in the United States
and Europe).
16. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonization of Law:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557, 569-72 (1994) (describing attempts by the
United States government to influence antitrust law in Eastern Europe and other parts of the
world).
17. As prominent anthropologists and other social scientists have noted in other contexts,
often the act of observing and seeking to observe a supposedly less advanced nation produces
significant changes in the observer. See TOM NAIRN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN: CRISIS AND
NEO-NATIONALISM (2d ed. 1981); THE STUDY OF CULTURE AT A DISTANCE (Margaret Mead &
Rhoda Metraux eds., 1953). One current example of this phenomenon can be seen in the recent
report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee of the Justice Department
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III. LESSONS FOR AMERICA
In short, it is the best of times to reexamine many of the fundamental
principles of United States competition policy in light of the experience
of the rest of the world. What follows is a discussion of three issues: 1)
the application of competition rules to the public sector;' 8 2) the
relationship between antitrust and regulation; 19 and 3) the relationship
between antitrust and antidumping law. 20 Foreign competition law
represents an attractive altemative to the orthodox way these issues are
analyzed under United States competition policy. In each case, United
States policy has been blinded by perceiving antitrust as a separate
sphere limited in its application. Conversely, foreign systems have both
a more nuanced and more holistic view of the benefits of competition,
allowing the application of antitrust rules with sensible limitations to
areas which the United States regards as completely off-limits to
competition policy.
To the extent United States policy makers have confronted these
issues, they have either ignored or rejected foreign experience as a
useful guide. 21 I suggest that a closer look reveals that examining the
foreign approaches in each of these areas is sound, not because it would
be good for other nations or the global community, but because it would
better serve the traditional conceptions of antitrust law as it has evolved
in the United States.
A. The Need to Control Public as Well as Economic Power
Antitrust law has been a long struggle over fear of power. 22 Since the
passage of the Sherman Act, however, there has been an equally
contentious struggle over what kinds of accumulations of power are

(ICPAC). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT (2000). In the course of recommending the best
practices for the global antitrust committee, the report ends up recommending numerous changes
in U.S. practices as well. See id.
18. See infra notes 24-69.
19. See infra notes 70-82.
20. See infra notes 83-98.
21. For example, none of the leading antitrust casebooks used as the basic antitrust teaching
tools in American law schools systematically analyze or discuss foreign or comparative antitrust
issues. This structural weakness is being remedied in the forthcoming new edition of the
casebook by Professor Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, now being joined by Professor
Rudolph Peritz.
22. See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW (1996) (analyzing how the history of competition policy in the United
States has been shaped by the fear of political and economic domination).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

feared most, namely the public sector or the private sector. One's views
determines where one
on which is the greater of the two evils normally
23
stands on the great antitrust questions of the day.
1. American Antitrust Law and the Public Sector
American antitrust law has taken an unusually narrow view of the
type of power regulated under our competition statutes. United States
antitrust law has chosen to regulate private, but not public,
anticompetitive conduct. 24 Beginning with the Supreme Court's
decision in Parkerv. Brown,25 there has been a consistent line of cases
holding that the antitrust laws apply only to private economic actors and
not state governmental entities. 26 The antitrust laws apply with
somewhat greater vigor to municipal entities. Broad immunity,
however, applies to municipal entities that are acting pursuant to state
delegated power and have an articulated policy of replacing competition
with regulation. 27 Even private actors enjoy substantial immunity if
23. The widely divergent reactions to the Microsoft litigation reveal the contemporary version
of this dichotomy. Compare William Safire, The Curse of Bigness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999,
at A22 (arguing that concentrated power in American big business is the greatest danger to
capitalism), with John McCain, High-Tech America at High Noon; Heavy Hand of Government
Threatening U.S. Ingenuity, HOUST. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1998, Outlook, at I (arguing that the
"heavy hand of government" is "more likely to stifle and smother new initiatives [by oppressive
regulation or excessive taxation] than any other force"). For the historical twists and turns as to
how these dual fears have affected United States competition policy see PERITZ, supra note 22.
24. From time to time, the United States has flirted with other doctrines to control public
sector anticompetitive conduct outside of the antitrust context. For much of the late 19th century
and early 20th century, the courts used the doctrine of substantive economic due process in this
fashion. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). More
recently, the Supreme Court has used the doctrine of commercial free speech in a similar fashion.
See Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
25. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942) (holding that a marketing plan adopted by the state
for regulating the handling, disposition, and prices of raisins produced in California was not
within the intended scope of, and therefore not a violation of, the Sherman Act).
26. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (holding actions of the Committee on
Examinations and Admissions to the Bar are actions of the State Supreme Court and therefore
exempt from antitrust laws under the state action doctrine).
27. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) (holding
that the City of Columbia's restriction of billboard construction was immune from federal
antitrust liability because it was an authorized implementation of state policy, the city possessed
clear delegated authority to suppress competition, and the suppression of competition was at the
very least a foreseeable result of zoning regulations); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34 (1985) (holding that the city of Eau Claire's acquisition of a monopoly over the provision
of sewage treatment services was protected by the state action exemption because the city was
acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy contemplating anticompetitive conduct by the
city and evidencing the state policy of displacing competition with regulation in the area of
municipal provision of sewage services); Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that an ordinance enacted by the city of Boulder prohibiting
petitioner from expanding its cable television business was not exempt because it was enacted in
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they can establish that they are acting pursuant to a clearly articulated
state regulatory policy, and the state actively supervises the private
conduct. 28
Moreover, private conduct intended to obtain
anticompetitive government action is immune from antitrust laws,
29
unless merely a sham to directly interfere with a competitor.
These broad immunities were almost entirely created by the judiciary
and run counter to the general trend within United States antitrust
jurisprudence to narrowly construe statutory immunities and avoid
implying antitrust immunities except where necessary to implement
some other statutory scheme. The only equivalent judicially created
immunity unrelated to the state action doctrine and the closely related
Noerr-Pennington doctrine consisted of the Supreme Court's lightly
regarded decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.30 In this case, the
Court held that professional baseball was not subject to the antitrust
laws because it did not constitute interstate commerce. 3 1 This
unprecedented judicial immunity for professional baseball has been
32
heavily criticized and recently has been repealed by statute.
The Supreme Court has justified the state action doctrine and the
related immunities discussed above on two grounds. First, the Supreme
Court relied on legislative history to suggest that Congress only
the absence of any regulation by the state and was not implementing any clearly articulated state
policy).
28. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (holding that California's wine pricing system was not immune from federal antitrust
liability, even though it was pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, because it did not meet the requirement that the policy be actively supervised by the state
itself).
29. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993) (holding that deprivation of immunity as a sham requires a two-part analysis: first, the
lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits, and second, only if the litigation is objectively meritless can a court
examine a litigant's subjective motivation, focusing on whether the suit conceals an attempt to
interfere directly with a competitor's business relationship); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (pattern of baseless administrative litigation to deter
entry by competitor constituted sham litigation not immune under antitrust laws); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (lobbying of executive branch to obtain government
action detrimental to competition immune from antitrust laws); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that solicitation by
railroads of governmental action destructive to the trucking business was not violative of the
Sherman Act by any anticompetitive purposes it may have had).
30. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
31. See id. at 209.
32. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 27(a) (West Supp. 1998). See generally BASEBALL AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 75-160 (Spencer Weber Waller et al. eds., 1995).
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33
intended to regulate private market behavior and not political conduct.
Second, the Supreme Court raised the specter that applying the antitrust
would raise important
laws to state action or lobbying activity
34
questions.
Amendment
federalism and First
In recent years, the trend in the United States toward immunity for
state governments both in general and in antitrust law has, if anything,
broadened. 35 The Supreme Court has broadened the scope of Eleventh
Amendment and extra-constitutional sovereign immunity for states to
limit their exposure to suits for damages of all kinds, even for those
federal statutes once thought the preeminent law of the land.3 6 Even
though lower courts are not yet using the Eleventh Amendment to
dismiss antitrust claims against state governments and agencies, they
the same
typically use the narrower state action doctrine to accomplish
37
questions.
constitutional
broader
the
result without reaching

2. Public Sector Antitrust Law Abroad
Outside of the United States, there has been a broad trend in the
opposite direction toward applying competition rules to both the private
and the public sector, while making some adjustments for public sector
38
activity that is indispensable to the functioning of the government.
33. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1942).
34. See id. at 352; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
35. See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism:
Parkerand Arc America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29 (2000).
36. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit by private individuals); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
did not abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity, nor was it voluntarily waived); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate states'
sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1997) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against states to
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause).
37. See, e.g., Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d
24, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) ("This doctrine is [so] well settled that its rationale and underpinnings are
scarcely worth discussing."), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 615 (1999). But see Earles v. State Bd. of
Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1036-44 (5th Cir. 1998) (using the Eleventh
Amendment to immunize the state defendant and using the state action doctrine to protect the
individual defendants), reh'g en banc denied, 146 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied, 525
U.S. 982 (1998). As to the application of the Eleventh Amendment to antitrust claims, see
generally Susan Beth Farmer, Altering the Balance Between State Sovereignty and Competition:
The Impact of Seminole Tribe on Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1403 (1997).
38. And quite rightly so, for why have democratic government decision making if the results
must slavishly follow the fashions of markets?
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One need not go as far as Robert Bork 39 or the libertarian critics of
antitrust that claim government power is virtually the only source of
lasting market power 4° to acknowledge that governmental action can be
a powerful source of anticompetitive power and outcomes. Indeed, one
of the critical insights of public choice theory4 1 is that well-organized,
narrowly focused private interests will frequently use government
processes to seek monopoly rents and otherwise insulate themselves
from competitive processes.4 2
The foreign experience on this issue suggests there is a better way.
The European Union ("EU"), which is composed of sovereign
governments, not merely states in a federal system, has recognized the
importance of controlling the anticompetitive acts of Member-States,
public enterprise, and the private firms given special privileges by those
states. Such actions threatened the creation and maintenance of the
common market just as the equivalent actions of private undertakings.
In addition to the now common rules prohibiting anticompetitive
44
agreements between undertakings, 43 abuses of a dominant position,
45
and legislation prohibiting anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions,

39. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978).
40. See DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY
FAILURE (2d ed. 1990); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL
(1986).
41. Public choice theory relies on the fundamental proposition that people behave in political
arenas in much the same manner as they behave in economic markets. See generally DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
As one prominent public choice scholar has stated:
The model of public choice insists that the same rational, self-interest-seeking motives
that animates human action in ordinary markets be applied to decision making in the
public sector as well. The assumption that all individuals, in or out of government,
pursue their own self-interests is the fundamental tenet of public choice. Just as
consumers want to maximize their utility and firms want to maximize their profits,
public policy makers want to maximize their welfare.
William F. Shugart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 7, 9 (Fred S. McChesney &
William F. Shugart II eds., 1995).
42. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 41, for the application of public choice theory to
antitrust issues; Shugart, supra note 41, at 7; PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM
THE INSIDE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Robert J. McKay et. al. eds., 1987).
43. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85
available in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 85 (1957) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
44. See EEC TREATY, supra note 43, art. 86.
45. Commission Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395/1) (discussing merger control, as
amended).
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46
the EU included provisions in Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome
applying these same rules to the actions of Member-States, public
enterprise, and private firms enjoying special privileges.
Article 90 has a three-part structure and states in Article 90(1):
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which MemberStates grant special or exclusive rights, Member-States shall not enact
or maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this
Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and
Articles 85 to 94.47
An important, but limited, exception is contained in Article 90(2),
which reads:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of
be affected to such
48
the community.
Finally, the European Commission is given the power in Article 90(3)
issue directives to the Member-States
to enforce Article 90 and to
49
implementation.
its
regarding
The European Commission has taken its duties seriously under
Article 90 and brought numerous cases in recent years. 50 The European

46. The Treaty of Amsterdam both amended and renumbered the articles of the Treaty of
Rome, including the competition provisions. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1, 37 I.L.M. 56. Thus, the former Articles 85, 86, and
90 are now Articles 81, 82, and 86 respectively. This article uses the old numbering system for
convenience only.
47. EEC TREATY art. 90(1). Article 7 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality,
and Articles 85-94 cover competition policy. These rules are reinforced by Articles 2-3 of the
European Union Treaty which establish competition policy as one of the fundamental foundations
of the European Union and Article 5 which obligates Member-States to refrain from action which
would jeopardize achievement of European Union's goals and treaty provisions. See TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2-3, 5, 31 I.L.M. 247 (ratified Nov. 1, 1993).
48. EEC TREATY art. 90(2).
49. A directive is a form of secondary legislation whereby the European Commission, the
Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament enact through prescribed procedures measures
which require the Member-States of the EU to take the necessary steps within their national legal
systems to implement the purpose and specific actions called for by the directive. See EEC
TREATY, supra note 43, art. 189, at 351. See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 74-75 (George A. Berman ed., 1993).
50. See ATWOOD ET AL., supra note 12, § 16.5 at 16-24 (discussing application of Art. 90);
FRANCOISE BLUM & ANNE LOGUE, STATE MONOPOLIES UNDER EC LAW (1998) (explaining the
fundamental changes that have taken place in the application of EU Treaty rules to state
monopolies).
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Court of Justice has interpreted the basic prohibition of Article 90(1)
broadly and the exemption in Article 90(2) narrowly to create a system
that safeguards truly vital Member-States' interests, but otherwise
subjects both the public and private sectors within the EU to reasonably
uniform competition rules. 5' The European Commission has also used
its powers to issue directives sparingly, but effectively, to hasten the
application of competition principles to the telecommunications
52
sector.
Even without the extensive use of directives, both the European
Commission and private parties applying EU competition rules in
Member-State courts through the principle of direct effect have used
Article 90 effectively to restore competition to a variety of sectors
previously dominated by state-owned or state-sponsored monopolies.
Critical cases have brought competition, where there was once none, to
such industries as the media, banking, transportation, and music
53
publishing.
The EU is hardly alone in seeing the value of applying competition
rules to both the public and private sector. Pursuant to a variety of
treaty arrangements, the basic structure of Article 90 applies to the
countries of the European Economic Area, 54 the former socialist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe seeking future membership in
the EU,55 and a whole host of other transition economies who look to
56
the EU as a source of inspiration for their new competition laws.

51. See ATWOOD ET AL., supra note 12, § 16.5 at 16-24 (discussing how Member-States may
not grant specific privileges which would avoid the constraints of competition); Wood, supra note
3, at 422-25 (contrasting EU law with state action doctrine which fails to create uniform boundary
between federal and state competition policy).
52. See, e.g., Commission Directive 96/2, 1996 O.J. (C 20) (discussing mobile and personal
communications); Commission Directive 96/13, 1996 O.J. (L 74 0) (discussing full competition
in telecommunications); Commission Directive 95/51, 1995 O.J. (L 256/49) (expanding
competition in telecommunications services).
53. See generally Commission Annual Report on European Community Competition Policy,
at II (detailing enforcement of Article 90); LENNART RITTER ET AL., EEC COMPETITION LAW: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 43-51 (1991). See, e.g., Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di
Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 422 (1991); Case C-41/90, Hofner
and Elser v. Macroton GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (1991); Case 155/73,
Italy v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974); Case 127/73, Belgische Radio
en Televisie v. S.A.B.A.M,, 1974 E.C.R. 313, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 238 (1973).
54. See generally THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA EC-EFTA: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES (Julien Stuyk & A. Looijestijn-Clearie eds., 1994).
55. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room - Why
Must the Central European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 351 (1997).
56. For example, such diverse nations as the Philippines, Turkey, Croatia, Slovenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, and Brazil apply their competition laws to both public
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Even Mexico, which adopted its antitrust law in the shadow of the
United States antitrust laws as an informal prerequisite for the
negotiation of NAFTA, has provisions applying competition principles
to its public sector. 57 Indeed, some of its principal successes have come
in stopping the anticompetitive activities of state and local governments
and public enterprises. 58 Australia and New Zealand are additional
notable examples of countries applying their competition rules to both
59
public and private enterprise in an even-handed manner.
3. The Weakness of Federalism
In addition to being inconsistent with state practice around the world,
the state action doctrine in the United States also illustrates the general
weakness of federal states and systems in the international trading
system. Under the rules of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
federal states have the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, such
nations bear broad responsibility for the actions of their sub-federal
governmental units and can be responsible for violations of trading rules
even where they lack the pragmatic ability to control sub-federal
governments. 60 On the other hand, when it comes time to negotiate
reductions to trade barriers with other nations, they cannot offer as
complete a package of concessions as unitary nations because many
trade barriers of sub-federal units are beyond their constitutional or
pragmatic ability to control. 6 1 Accordingly, their ability to obtain as
great a package of concessions from other nations is restricted as well.

and private sector activity.
57. See "Ley Federal de Competencia Economica," L.C.E, 30 de junio de 1997 (Mex.); see
also ATWOOD ET AL, supra note 12, § 17.6 at 17-18 (describing the principal provisions of
Mexico's Economic Competition Law); Allan Van Fleet, Mexico's Federal Economic
Competition Law: The Dawn of a New Antitrust Era, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 183 (1995).
58. ATWOOD ET AL., supra note 12, § 17.8 at 17-26 (discussing the Federal Competition
Commission and its role in enforcing the Economic Competition Law).
59. Trade Practice Act, 1974, ch. 2(B)(1) (Austl.); Commerce Act, 1986, § 36 (N.Z.). But see
Attorney General v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 (Can.) (approving
antitrust exemption for conduct pursuant to provincial regulatory scheme citing Parkerv. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1942) approvingly).
60. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 7, 1948, A 24(12), 62 U.N.T.S. 56
[hereinafter GATT].
61. One telling example is the continuing negotiations and controversy over the reduction of
trade barriers in government procurement policies. Under the auspices of the GATT and now the
WTO, a number of governments have negotiated voluntary codes that require non-discriminatory
treatment of foreign vendors in government procurement policies. In these negotiations, the
United States can only offer binding assurances as to the purchasing decisions of federal
agencies. Even if Congress technically could bind the states to such international agreements
through its power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, such a statute is politically
unthinkable. The best that the United States could do was obtain the voluntary cooperation of a
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This general weakness may soon come to haunt the United States in
the competition area as well. Many nations are pressing for the WTO to
include competition issues as a topic for future negotiations. 62 While
the United States vigorously opposes any formal negotiations at this
time, 63 it will be hampered by the existence of the state action
exemption, other exemptions, and decentralized features of United
64
States antitrust enforcement if and when such negotiations do occur.
Even if such negotiations do not occur within the WTO, the United
States is already facing the pressures and handicaps of the state action
doctrine in other international fora. The United States is currently
negotiating competition policy issues in such disparate contexts as the
NAFTA, the Free Trade of the America negotiations, the Asia Pacific
Economic Progress Forum, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). The United States will
increasingly feel the sting of not maximizing its bargaining leverage
both within the competition area and in negotiations linked between
competition and other sectors.
This is a result of numerous
anticompetitive restrictions at the state and local level which are simply
off limits for United States' negotiators to trade for concessions.
The state action doctrine and similar exemptions have also been
criticized as inconsistent with the kind of regulatory reform that the
United States normally promotes in international fora. For example, the
OECD, in its review of United States competition law and policy, has
noted that state regulation and exemption from the federal antitrust laws
may delay reform in a wide variety of sectors of the United States
65
economy.

large number of states in order to sweeten its offer to its trading partners. Even this solution has
proven unsatisfactory since many of these same states have passed trade sanctions aimed at
foreign governments which have undercut the value of these voluntary concessions. See Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (striking down Massachusetts'
sanctions statute limiting state procurement from companies dealing with the current regime in
Burma).
62. See ATWOOD ET AL., supra note 12, § 18.11 at 18-22 (discussing the role of GATT and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in competition law).
63. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, 1998
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1; U.S. Welcomes WTO Decision to Continue Antitrust Talks but Rules
Out Negotiations, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 2087 (1998); Klein Reviews and Projects Trends in
InternationalAntitrust Enforcement, 73 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 400 (1997).
64. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501,
1541 (1998); cf. Wood, supra note 3, at 425 (arguing that the United States is subject to pressures
at an international level that tends to diminish the role of local government units in competition
matters).
65. See Michael Wise, Review of United States Competition Law and Policy, I OECD J.
COMP. L. & POL. 9, 62 (1999) (stating that anti-competitive state laws and the state action
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The point is not that the United States necessarily can or should trade
away the state action doctrine in the course of international
negotiations, 66 but that the elimination, or limitation, of this judicially
created and ill-defined exemption has the potential to provide great
benefits to the United States both domestically and in promoting its
national interest at the international level.
One need not debate whether the state action doctrine can, or should,
be eliminated to suggest a more advantageous way to apply United
States antitrust principles in light of foreign experiences in the
regulation of public sector abuses. Respect for federalism, in both a
constitutional and a political sense, suggests that certain state actions
must remain off-limits to competition rules. Unless, and until, Congress
affirmatively and constitutionally preempts the states from imposing
anticompetitive regulation in certain sectors, 67 such decisions should be
respected at some level.
I join with a number of other commentators, however, in seeking
fundamental restrictions to the state action doctrine as a matter of
fundamental competition policy. 68 If one cares about a competitive
economy, one cares about restrictions to competition regardless of the
source. The EU and others show that immunity at the sub-federal level
can be restricted in a nuanced and respectful way, leaving room for
fundamental state policy to deviate from competition in the provision of
key services of a general nature.
They also limit, however,
anticompetitive restrictions in the type of markets when national policy
dictates faith in the process of competition.
If Congress did not consider whether competition law should be
applied to the public sector in 1890, it should do so now. If the normal
competition rules need to be modified or limited in their application to
the public sector either for sound policy reasons or for prudential

exemption may delay reform in areas such as professional services, telecommunications, and
electric power).
66. But see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding validity of treaty imposing
regulations which were potentially beyond the power of Congress to enact as legislation under the
prevailing view of the Commerce Clause at the time).
67. The question of what state laws and functions are preempted by the federal antitrust laws
is closely related to the state action doctrine but subject to considerable confusion. See HERBERT
H. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 20.1 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667
(1991); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism,75 CAL. L. REV. 227 (1987); William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State
Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
189 (1993); John Shephard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1986).
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political reasons, so be it. 69 If Congress prefers a broad system of
immunity, I would oppose such action, but welcome the open debate
about the benefits and costs of the present system and the preferable
alternatives that foreign experience has shown. At a minimum, a
coherent legislative decision would be welcome instead of the ad hoc
development of a judicial immunity so otherwise alien to our antitrust
experience.
B. Antitrust as Regulation
There is a peculiar view in the United States that antitrust represents
the antithesis of regulation. These dual methods of public policy toward
business inappropriately tend to be viewed as separate spheres, just as
private and public sectors have been improperly separated for antitrust
enforcement purposes. Regardless of whether this was ever an accurate
way of depicting these bodies of law, it has little applicability to the
legal environment today. We live in a regulatory era of antitrust
enforcement where most antitrust law is made by the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission through the promulgation of guidelines, the issuance of
advisory opinions, the review by the enforcement agencies of most
mergers before they are consummated, and the negotiation of consent
decrees that bear only a partial resemblance to the governing, but
increasingly obsolete, case law.7 ° The courts both have abdicated their
traditional common law function in this area and have tended to defer to
the pronouncements of the Antitrust Division and the FTC, as courts do
71
with the interpretations of other expert regulatory bodies.
Despite all evidence to the contrary, including the routine way in
which antitrust is described as regulatory in the popular media, the
antitrust agencies insist on referring to their mission as "law

69. For example, a spate of treble damage lawsuits in the 1980s against municipalities led
Congress to eliminate damage actions in such circumstances but retain injunctive actions. See 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 35-36 (West 1997 and Supp. 2000).
70. See also Thomas Kauper, The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer
or Regulator?, in 1 THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE: AN ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 435 (Theodore P. Kovaleff ed., 1994); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a
Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 997 (1986)
(focusing more on the regulatory nature of merger enforcement). See generally Spencer Weber
Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L.
REv. 1383 (1998).
71. See Waller, supra note 70, at 1407-08 (analogizing to Chevron deference in administrative
law). The irony is that, if anything, the courts grant more deference to the DOJ, as opposed to the
FTC, which is the only true administrative agency with a mandate from Congress to regulate
competition.
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enforcement" rather than "regulation. 7 2
The supposed law
enforcement nature of the United States system normally is compared
favorably with foreign systems like the EU which are described as
73
regulatory in nature.
Other countries have avoided this unproductive fight over the nature
of antitrust law and more properly conceive competition policy as a
continuum of governmental responses to particular types of markets,
forms of ownership, and business conduct. Competition policy is
viewed in a positive way as a form of light regulation to replace the
heavy hand of the state or administrative agencies previously in charge
of entry and pricing decisions. Perhaps the most advanced nation in this
regard is New Zealand. At the forefront of privatization and
deregulation in such industries as telecommunications, banking, and
energy, New Zealand has expressly adopted competition policy as
virtually the sole form of light-handed regulation for its economy. 74 As
a prominent group of New Zealand economists recently noted:
[C]ompetition policy has, from the enactment of the Commerce Act in
1986, sought to minimize government and regulatory intervention and
to place reliance on actual and potential competition for the regulation
of prices and monopoly behavior. The Commerce Act is not specific
about the "public benefit" criterion on which firms and individuals'
actions are evaluated but its central component is economic efficiency.
The legal framework was molded by competition policy that rested on
much less regulation in general, and minimal industry-specific
regulation in particular. The absence of any industry-specific
regulatory body and the possibility of price control characterize most
of New Zealand's
commerce. It has become known as "light handed"
75
regulation.
In New Zealand, most disputes over interconnection and other
aspects of the type of network industries involved in light regulation
have been resolved through a combination of negotiation and private
litigation, as well as public enforcement actions of the New Zealand
72. Id. at 1384 (noting that officials of the Antitrust Division and the FTC describe their role
as "law enforcement," not as regulators).
73. See 76 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 271 (1999).
74. See Alan Bollard & Michael Pickford, Utility Regulation in New Zealand, in REGULATING
UTILITtES: BROADENING THE DEBATE 75 (M.E. Beesley ed. 1997) [hereinafter Utility
Regulation]; MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, LIGHT-HANDED REGULATION OF THE NEW ZEALAND
ELECTRICITY AND GAS INDUSTRIES (1995); Alan E. Bollard & Michael Pickford, New Zealand's
'Light-Handed'Approach to Utility Regulation, 2 AGENDA 411, 412 (1995) [hereinafter LightHanded Approach]; Lewis Evans et al., Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit
of Efficiency, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1856 (1996); Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization:
An Analytic Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 375 (1996).
75. Evans et al., supra note 74, at 1885.
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Commerce Act, rather than traditional agency dictates and
administrative proceedings. 76 While the policy of light-handed
regulation is not without critics, 77 most commentators appear to be
cautiously optimistic that it has served its role of safeguarding both
consumers and the economy78during a period of massive and rapid
privatization and deregulation.
I offer these examples not to specifically endorse the substance of
79
New Zealand's policy, which continues to be debated in that country,
but to illustrate a more helpful discourse about the nature of competition
policy. New Zealand has proved the political and economic viability of
recognizing the regulatory nature of competition policy while
preserving, if not enhancing, the role of antitrust rules within a national
economy.
The irony is that the foreign competition systems perceived in the
United States as "regulatory" are taking steps to become more
judicialized 80 and more oriented toward dispute resolution through
private litigation and public enforcement actions. In particular, the EU
has taken steps to eliminate many of the routine advance filings for

76. Id. at 1888-90. For the substance of the New Zealand Commerce Act, see generally
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 1991).
77. See Utility Regulation, supra note 74, at 122-24 (discussing high litigation and
enforcement costs, incumbency advantages, under assessment of complexity of regulating of
vertically integrated natural monopolies, and insufficient attention to demands on courts); Ross
Patterson, Light-Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years On, 6 COMP. & CONS. L.J. 134,
149-51 (1998) (arguing that the policy of light-handed regulation was flawed from the beginning
and is still generally deficient regarding dealings with industries); see also Rex Ahdar, The Privy
Council and "Light-Handed Regulation, " 111 L.Q. REV. 217 (1995) (critiquing the principal
application of the Commerce Act provision that governs access by new telecommunication
entrants to a dominant firm's network).
78. See Light-HandedApproach, supra note 74, at 421 ("[T]he policy has made inroads into
areas of monopoly power in a relatively short time, and from a former status quo of government
ownership and heavy regulation."); Chris Pleatsikas & Bruce Turner, Electric Competition in
New Zealand: Putting Last Things First, 134 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 26, 30 (1996).
79. The recent election in New Zealand resulted in the replacement of the National
government by a coalition government led by the Labour Party. Competition policy was an
important issue with the policy of light-handed regulation often equated with a lack of regulation
and proposals to both strengthen the Commerce Act and the possible reintroduction of certain
forms of industry specific regulation to prevent abuses in sectors such as telecommunications and
electrical power. See LABOUR NEW ZEALAND 2000, IMPROVING COMPETITION (1999); Brian
Fallow, Major Players Both Seeking Tougher Line on Competition, NZ HERALD (Nov. 18, 1999);
Kevin Norquay, Anderton Moves to Placate Business, DAILY NEWS (New Plymouth), Nov. 29,
1999 (detailing Alliance party leader's views in favor of regulating telecommunications industry);
Power Probe DetailSoon, THE EVENING POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 3.
80. For a discussion of the historical evolution of the European national competition systems
in this direction see generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998).
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most vertical distribution agreements 8' and to radically decentralize the
enforcement of EU competition law by stripping the European
82
Commission of its exclusive control of EU competition provisions.
The European Commission proposed this radical power stripping in the
hope of relieving itself of the more routine review functions in order to
preserve the discretion and resources to pursue the biggest and most
significant violations. At the same time, the power of Member-State
courts to handle all aspects of EU competition law would be increased,
further judicializing the system. It is hoped that the result will produce
more Member-State enforcement actions and more private law suits, a
multiplicity of actors and actions reminiscent of the United States!
The result is a meeting in the middle. The United States can no
longer be characterized as the pure law enforcement system that its
chief competition officials would like to suggest, nor can the EU and
most serious foreign competition systems be viewed as creatures of
regulation as once may have been the case. With a common lexicon,
the chances for harmonization, or at least cross-influence and a
constructive dialogue, are further enhanced with the United States
freeing itself from a mind-set that further complicates the delicate
process of learning from abroad in the competition field.
C. The Anathema of Antidumping Law
Another area dominated by the separate sphere type of thinking is the
tortured relationship between antitrust and antidumping law. The
growth of antitrust and foreign experience suggests the fundamental
weakness with the United States' love affair with antidumping law. In a
nutshell, antidumping law applies when imported goods are sold in the
83
United States for less than they are sold for in their country of origin.
Once dumping is proven and measured, an antidumping duty equal to

81. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing reforms proposed by the European
Commission).
82. Commission Programme 99/027 of 28 April 1999 White Paper on the Modernization of
the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the E.C. Treaty, available at European Union,
Europa (visited Sept. 22, 2000) <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competitition/antitrustU
others.html>.
83. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994) (imposing antidumping duties if an American industry is
materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports that are being sold for
less than fair value); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (providing definitions); see
also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 435 (1995).
For a sense of the
complexities and vagaries of antidumping investigations under United States law, see JOSEPH E.
PATYISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS (1984).
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the difference between the United States' price and the home market
price is applied.8 4
The relationship between antidumping and antitrust law is complex,
but primarily antagonistic. One would be hard pressed to find a scholar
steeped in competition law and policy who supports current
antidumping rules. Most would prefer their outright replacement with a
competition-based regime that could address any serious instance of
dumping that actually harms consumers and the process of
competition. 85 At best, antidumping law can be used to attack true
international predatory pricing, 86 but the vast majority of the time it is
used to penalize simple price differences that would not even be
actionable domestically under the Robinson-Patman Act. 87 Many of
these price differences are either pro-competitive or benign from a
competitive standpoint. In addition to penalizing the kind of behavior
that competition law normally wishes to promote, the misuse of the
antidumping and other import relief laws can become an outright
88
antitrust violation.
More typically, these laws represent a seemingly neutral set of rules
that permit a highly damaging disguised form of protectionism. Many
nations now follow the example of the United States and enforce their
own set of antidumping laws. In this world, the United States suffers
doubly. America imposes dramatic costs on both its own economy and
consumers to provide partial, indirect relief to a limited number of
domestic industries. At the same time, it hinders its export performance
through encouraging the creation of foreign antidumping laws that
penalize the more aggressive pricing strategies of our most successful
exporters.
84. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994).
85. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12
(1999); Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1996);
Ronald A. Cass, Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International
Trade: A Comment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 877 (1993); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the
Twenty-first Century-Rounding the Circle, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 535 (1993); Robert W.
McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 N.W. J. INTEL L. & Bus. 491 (1993);
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The InternationalTrade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for
a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393 (1994); Diane P. Wood,
"Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-BasedApproach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (1989).
86. This, of course, depends on the extent such an animal exists at all. See Robert W. McGee,
An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with Implicationsfor International
Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 560 (1993).
87. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (prohibiting price discrimination where
effect may be to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly).
88. See WALLER, supra note 85, § 13 (discussing circumstances where bringing or settling
antidumping cases violates antitrust laws).
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Our commitment to the preservation and expansion of this type of
regime can only be explained in terms of classic public choice theory,
whereby the narrow, well-focused efforts of industries and workers
benefiting from the antidumping laws have greater political power than
the broader but more diffuse lobbying efforts of consumers and
exporters.
There are also collateral costs. The United States vehemently
opposes the introduction of a dialogue on competition principles in the
WTO, 89 in part because of the fear that such conversations will be the
springboard for the replacement of antidumping rules with competition
rules.
Domestically, the mandate of the Justice Department's
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee was similarly
circumscribed, leaving the section of its report on trade and competition
90
policy a shadow of what it could have been.
While it is unfortunate that antidumping laws are a fact of life, there
are partial and realistic solutions if we again look abroad to see how
other countries and trading blocks have addressed the inherent tension
between antidumping and competition law. Instead of focusing on the
unlikely abolition of the antidumping statutes, one should focus on the
experience of countries where antidumping law has been eliminated or
modified in the context of the creation of a free trade area or customs
union.
If a nation integrates its economy with one or more of its trading
partners, antidumping law should be one of the first non-tariff barriers
to be eliminated. At a legal level, this may in fact be a requirement of
the WTO, which permits free trade areas and customs unions to be
formed and to allow trade concessions among members, which are not
extended to other WTO members, only upon the condition that "duties
and other restrictive regulations of commerce ...are eliminated with
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
' 91
territories."
The elimination of antidumping rules for free trade partners also
makes sense from both a competition and trade policy perspective.
Historically, a free trade relationship has involved the elimination of

89. See supra note 63 (citing sources that indicate the United States' opposition to negotiating
issues of competition in the WTO).
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT Ch. 5 (2000).
91. GATT, supra note 60, art. xxiv, § 8(a)(I), (b); see also GATT,ANALYTICAL INDEX:
GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 736-808 (6th ed. 1994).
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antidumping rules because the partners are creating a new single market
in place of the dual or multiple markets of the past in which
antidumping rules functioned as a penalty for "unfair" tactics and as a
92
safety valve regulating trade between different economic structures.
Two great historical examples illustrate this principle. The first is the
experience of the United States. Once the separate colonies created a
nation, and not merely a confederation, the newly created states of the
Union were constitutionally barred from imposing any form of import
or export duties on trade between the American states. 93 Similarly,
when the European Economic Community was created in the late
1950s, it learned the American lesson well. In the Treaty of Rome, the
Member-States were barred after a brief transition period from imposing
antidumping or any other form of duties on trade between the MemberStates. 94 Price differences between Member-States are dealt with as an
abuse of a dominant position under the competition rules rather than as
95
a trade issue.
Most recent and limited forms of free trade relationships have
continued the trend of eliminating antidumping rules. New Zealand and
Australia concluded a free trade agreement in 1983, which included the
elimination of antidumping rules for trans-Tasman trade and the
96
replacement of the dumping rules with true competition provisions.
Canada and Chile also eliminated antidumping rules in their free trade
agreement even though their economies are structurally quite different
and separated by thousands of miles. 97 Mercosur, the principal South
American free trade area, has pursued a similar path in eliminating
98
antidumping duties for trade within the bloc.

92. See JACKSON ETAL., supra note 83, at 668-71.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports
or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress"); see also Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford,
Law as IndustrialPolicy: Economic Analysis of the Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
1315, 1324 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution imposed a free trade zone on the United States).
94. See EEC TREATY, supra note 43, arts. 12-17.
95. See, e.g., Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3
C.M.L.R. 211 (1979); Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 1 C.M.L.R.
429 (1978).
96. See Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, Austl.-N.Z., art. IV, 22
I.L.M. 945, 950. New Zealand and Australia simultaneously harmonized their competition laws,
and created a mechanism for transborder enforcement.
97. See Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (last modified June 22, 1999)
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/englishlgeo/lac/cda-chile/chap-m26.htm>.
98. See Southern Common Market (Mercosur) Agreement (last modified Jan. 4, 1999)
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IV. SOMETIMES HIGHEST COMMON DENOMINATOR RULES

The divergence of United States competition policy from that of other
prominent jurisdictions around the world leads to the larger issue of the
costs and benefits of the current diverse state of global competition
policy. The proliferation of antitrust regimes around the world currently
presents the private and public sectors with the opposite of the old race
to the bottom problem. If anything, the current world of international
antitrust is best characterized by a form of "highest common
denominator rules." As a practical matter, if any significant jurisdiction
prohibits a horizontal or vertical type of agreement or imposes a
particular type of merger control, then all transnational businesses must
follow the most restrictive rules no matter what their home jurisdiction
is prepared to tolerate. 99 For example, an export cartel tolerated or even
encouraged by its home market must adhere to the basic anti-cartel
prohibitions of any market where the cartel does business, implements
Similarly, a
its pricing agreements, or produces significant effects.1'°
standard worldwide method of selective distribution cannot be
implemented if more than a couple of the relevant markets object on
competition grounds. Any merger of truly global enterprises is subject
to the most restrictive version of pre-merger notification and substantive
merger control in any important jurisdiction it does business in or plans
to do business in for the future.
One can only assume that this type of three-dimensional chess game
of counseling businesses and individuals in light of the welter of
different and occasionally inconsistent obligations will continue for the
foreseeable future. If nothing else, the growth of electronic commerce,
where the customer base is global in scope but unknowable in advance,
means that more and more firms will have to decide their business
practices taking into account the most stringent rule they can identify in
any significant jurisdiction. Firms then can either conform their
behavior accordingly or risk investigation and challenge if detected and
found to be subject to the jurisdiction of the offended competition
system.10 1 My unorthodox take on this collection of different rules on a

<http://www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur/mgi/mercosus.htm> (providing annex IV, art. V which
was effective as of Dec. 31, 1994).
99. This may also be an illustration of the phenomena that to ascribe nationality to
transnational business is impossible. See generally ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS
(1991); Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for InternationalEconomic Development, 32 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 209 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993); Case 89/85,
Ahlstrom Osakeyhito v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
101. Antitrust is hardly the only body of law to be affected in such a fashion. In particular,
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global scale is that it is basically a positive development with a handful
of exceptions. There are, to be sure, minor jurisdictions which have
imposed pre-merger filing requirements for transactions with little
connection to their market as a way of funding nascent competition
enforcement agencies.
In the scheme of global competition
enforcement and any particular transnational transaction, these are
minor irritants, not major policy matters.
What has emerged is not unlike the system in the United States with
multiple enforcers that act as a system of checks and balances. In the
United States, the competition laws are enforced by two different
federal agencies, the fifty states, and any private party that has been
injured in its business or property by reason of a violation of the
antitrust laws. If one jurisdiction loses interest in some aspect of
antitrust enforcement, there is now an antitrust safety net in the myriad
of other jurisdictions which are unlikely to adopt the same policy shift
at precisely the same moment. It also prevents any single jurisdiction
from pulling a fast one in a particular case. Even if one jurisdiction
wishes to permit an anticompetitive cartel, merger or abusive
monopolist, because the negative effects are felt elsewhere but not at
home, there are eager enforcers seeking to step into the breach to stop
this kind of beggar-thy-neighbor strategy. 10 2 Even when most nations
are in agreement about the illegality of a particular type of conduct,
multiple enforcers create a higher probability of detection, successful

lawyers must make a similar calculus in the emerging area of privacy law where standards in the
EU and elsewhere are more systematic and more restrictive of what data can be used and the
lawful manner of use than the scattering of privacy provisions found in United States law. See
generally PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996).
102. The Boeing-McDonnell merger, at least from the EU perspective, may be a partial
example of this phenomenon. The suspicion in the EU was that the Federal Trade Commission
chose not to challenge this merger because of the political and economic advantages of
strengthening Boeing as a national champion for the United States in global civil aviation markets
at the expense of Airbus the European consortium. Under this scenario, the EU was the only
jurisdiction that could effectively step in to challenge aspects of the transaction which affected its
market. However, the EU's insistence on conditions for approving the transaction that had little
to do with the acquisition itself created an equal suspicion that the EU was only acting as a result
of factors other than strictly competition concerns. See Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritorialityin
U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999); Crystal Jones-Starr,
Community-Wide v. Worldwide Competition: Why European Enforcement Agencies are Able to
Force American Companies to Modify Their Merger Proposals and Limit Their Innovations, 17
WISC. INT'L L. J. 145 (1999); Jeffrey A. Miller, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: The
European Commission's Costly Failureto Properly Enforce the Merger Regulation, 22 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 359 (1998). See generally Guzman, supra note 64, at 1532, 1533-35 (dealing
incentives for nations to underenforce competition rules where externalities are felt elsewhere).
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investigation, 10 3 and a complete package of punishment that reflects the
global effects of the unlawful conduct.
The multiplicity of jurisdictions and enforcers interested in antitrust
law and competition policy holds the potential for the United States to
relearn the best lesson it has taught the rest of the world, namely, that
competition matters, not just as a narrow matter of promoting various
forms of economic efficiency, but as a broad economic and political
commitment to a society without durable dominant economic interests
that exploit consumers, injure competitors, subvert the process of
competition, and eventually threaten political freedom as well. One
does not often hear this kind of talk in the United States anymore. 1 4 By
contrast, the spirit of this broad form of antitrust and competition policy
is alive and well throughout the world. If we can re-import this
fundamental notion that began in the nineteenth century industrial
revolution in the United States and has come to fruition around the
world at the beginning of the twenty-first century, then we have
(re)learned the greatest lesson that antitrust law has to teach us.
V. CONCLUSION

The United States often claims that the fifty states represent a unique
laboratory of experimentation for federal policy. If that is true, or at
least an honorable myth that we observe in practice, why not use the
more than eighty nations around the world with active competition laws
the same way? The comparative perspective is particularly helpful even
for sacred cows that our history tells us cannot be improved upon. Far
too frequently, there is compelling evidence that something works well
in practice that we have trouble accepting even in theory.
Globalization has created opportunities for both harmonization and
diversity. The United States needs both the wisdom and the humility to
look both abroad and at home at its own policies and determine where
change is needed and which direction that change should take.

103. This is particularly true when there is cooperation between enforcement agencies. See
generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L.
REv. 343, 360-74 (1997).
104. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965); Gary Minda,
Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749 (1995); Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).

